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Comment 
TAKE-HOME TOXIN: FOLLOWING KESNER’S LEAD AND 
CREATING A CONSISTENT FRAMEWORK 
FOR DETERMINING DUTY TOWARD VICTIMS OF 
SECONDARY ASBESTOS EXPOSURE 
BRENDAN KELLY* 
The explosion of American industry throughout the twentieth century 
was accomplished largely on the back of asbestos,1 a “wonder material” uti-
lized for its unique and versatile characteristics.2  Asbestos was used for eve-
rything from building skyscrapers to making home gardening products, and 
it was heavily relied upon during World War II because of its rare character-
istics—“stronger than steel,” yet flexible, waterproof, fireproof, and easily 
mined.3  However, as asbestos’s prevalence increased,4 so too did awareness 
of its negative health consequences.5  Ultimately, the value and utility of as-
bestos to industry were exceeded by the dangers it posed to human health.6  
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 1.  See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR ASBESTOS 1 (2001), http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tox-
profiles/tp61.pdf [hereinafter ASBESTOS PROFILE] (“Asbestos is the name given to a group of six 
different fibrous minerals (amosite, chrysotile, crocidolite, and the fibrous varieties of tremolite, 
actinolite, and anthophyllite) that occur naturally in the environment.”).  
 2.  See JEB BARNES, DUST-UP: ASBESTOS LITIGATION AND THE FAILURE OF COMMONSENSE 
POLICY REFORM 16 (2011) (explaining that asbestos is “literally a fiber made of rock,” and is “abun-
dant, cheap to mine, and amazingly versatile”).   
 3.  Id. at 17. 
 4.  American use of asbestos rapidly increased from about 20,000 metric tons in 1900, to its 
peak of 803,000 metric tons in 1973.  Id. at 16–17.  
 5.  ASBESTOS PROFILE, supra note 1, at 17; see also BARNES, supra note 2, at 17 (“Exposure 
to asbestos can cause mesothelioma, . . . asbestosis, . . . . [and] can produce pulmonary abnormali-
ties . . . .”); Martha Neil, Backing Away from the Abyss: Courts May Be Starting to Get a Grip on 
Asbestos Litigation, 92 A.B.A. J. 26, 29 (2006) (explaining that the health hazards of exposure to 
asbestos were well-recognized by the 1960s, and that some contend that “[some] companies knew 
of the risks as early as the 1930s”).  
 6.  See BARNES, supra note 2, at 17 (describing the lethal diseases caused by asbestos).  
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Asbestos use dramatically declined in the 1980s and 1990s,7 and while still 
technically legal in the United States, recent environmental regulations have 
created a path toward a total ban.8  Despite this decline in usage and its po-
tentially imminent prohibition, the delayed development of asbestos-related 
disease and illness means that its effects will continue to be realized well into 
the foreseeable future.9 
Beginning in the early 1970s, asbestos litigation largely consisted of 
employees’ claims asserting workplace exposure or consumer product liabil-
ity claims against manufacturers.10  However, in the last fifteen years, there 
has been an increase of so-called “secondary” or “take-home” exposure 
claims.11  Recently, in Kesner v. Superior Court,12 the Supreme Court of Cal-
ifornia ruled that employers and premises owners had a duty to prevent their 
on-site workers’ household members from being secondarily exposed to as-
bestos through the workers’ bodies and clothing.13  There, the court consoli-
dated two conflicting cases from the First and Second Districts of the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal.14  In resolving the district split, the Kesner court 
focused primarily on the foreseeability of secondary exposure and limited 
employer liability to an employees’ household members, as opposed to a 
wider-reaching group of plaintiffs.15 
                                                 
 7.  Id. at 18 fig.2.1.  
 8.  Gregory Korte, Obama Signs Bipartisan Chemical Safety Bill, USA TODAY (June 22, 
2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/22/obama-signs-bipartisan-chemi-
cal-safety-bill/86241008/ (“The Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act is 
the first major update to environmental legislation in two decades, overhauling the process for reg-
ulating toxic chemicals, [and] allowing the Environmental Protection Agency to ban substances like 
asbestos . . . .”). 
 9.  See William L. Anderson, The Unwarranted Basis for Today’s Asbestos “Take-Home” 
Cases, 39 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 107, 119–20 (2015) (stating the pool of potential asbestos-related 
plaintiffs is likely to remain consistent for the next several decades or longer).  
 10.  Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The Consequences of Asbestos Litigation, 26 REV. 
LITIG. 583, 589 (2007); see also Christopher J. O’Malley, Breaking Asbestos Litigation’s Choke-
hold on the American Judiciary, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1101, 1107 (2008) (noting that early asbestos 
exposure court decisions “expand[ed] the scope of liability from employers to suppliers and install-
ers of building materials” (alterations in original) (quoting Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's 
Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. 
REV. 33, 54 (2003))).  
 11.  See, e.g., Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 441 (6th Cir. 2009); Chais-
son v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 176 (La. Ct. App. 2006); Adams v. Owens-Illinois, 
Inc., 119 Md. App. 395, 441, 705 A.2d 58, 65 (1998); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 
116–17 (N.Y. 2005); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 351 (Tenn. 2008).  
The terms “secondary” and “take-home” can be used interchangeably. 
 12.  384 P.3d 283 (Cal. 2016).  
 13.  Id. at 288. 
 14.  Haver v. BNSF Ry. Co., 172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771 (Ct. App. 2014); Kesner v. Superior Court, 
171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 811 (Ct. App. 2014). 
 15.  Kesner, 384 P.3d at 291–93.  
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Kesner is the latest addition to an ever-growing list of state court deci-
sions on the issue of secondary asbestos exposure.16  State courts are gener-
ally split on whether the employer’s duty should extend beyond the work-
place.17  A small majority of states that have ruled on the matter currently 
hold that employers are not liable for secondary exposure because they have 
no relationship with the victim.18  Conversely, a growing minority of state 
courts have used reasoning similar to Kesner and found that because take-
home exposure was foreseeable, employers had a duty to prevent it.19 
This Comment will explore the legal history of this area of law, and it 
will explain how the Kesner decision adds to it.  First, it will examine the rise 
of asbestos regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(“OSHA”), which ultimately provided the basis for asbestos claims.20  Sec-
ond, it will present an overview of the conflict between the state courts on 
the issue of employer liability for secondary exposure, identifying the leading 
cases from states on each side of the divide.21  Third, this Comment will ex-
plore Maryland courts’ take-home asbestos decisions by identifying the 
prominent cases and delving into the reasoning used by the courts.22  Fourth, 
this Comment will analyze the Kesner court’s decision in further detail, high-
lighting the key rationale used by the court in reaching its holding.23 
Additionally, this Comment will argue that the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia’s holding in Kesner was correctly decided and can create a framework 
for future employer liability for secondary exposure decisions.24  Finally, it 
will assert that the reasoning in Kesner can serve as a guide for Maryland, 
and other state courts that have similarly declined to find a duty based on the 
lack of relationship, to find employer liability for secondary exposure without 
upsetting established tort regimes.25  Maryland’s reservation about extending 
employer liability beyond employees is related to its apprehension about cre-
ating an indeterminate number of plaintiffs.  This Comment will argue, how-
ever, that Kesner limits the potential plaintiffs who could exist, and the dis-
tinctive characteristics of take-home exposure cases will be definable in such 
a way that these decisions will not disturb Maryland’s existing employer duty 
law.26 
                                                 
 16.  See infra note 200. 
 17.  See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See infra notes 87–94 and accompanying text. 
 19.  See infra notes 54–60 and accompanying text.  
 20.  See infra Part I.A. 
 21.  See infra Part I.B. 
 22.  See infra Part I.C. 
 23.  See infra Part I.D. 
 24.  See infra Part II.A. 
 25.  See infra Part II.B. 
 26.  See infra Part II.B. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
Asbestos litigation has had a massive impact on American courts.27  As 
general asbestos litigation has settled, a new area of claims has developed, 
referred to as take-home or secondary exposure claims.28  This Part will first 
examine the rise of asbestos regulation by OSHA.29  The OSHA regulations 
were important in providing a basis for initial asbestos claims against em-
ployers and have played a substantial role in more recent take-home deci-
sions.30  While literature and scientific evidence have provided warnings 
about the dangers of asbestos since the 1930s,31 courts have largely marked 
OSHA’s 1972 asbestos regulations as the watermark for when employees 
knew or should have known of the dangers of asbestos exposure.32  Next, this 
Part will examine how states’ varying notions of duty have colored secondary 
exposure decisions in different jurisdictions.33  It will then examine the take-
home decisions in Maryland and discuss other related case law in the state.34  
Finally, this Part will examine the California Supreme Court’s decision in 
Kesner.35 
A.  Asbestos History: 1972 OSHA Regulations and the Rise of 
Asbestos-Related Litigation 
The first federal uniform regulations regarding exposure to asbestos 
were published by OSHA in 1972.36  These regulations set permissible expo-
sure concentrations, established appropriate work practices, and required the 
use of air-purifying respirators in the workplace.37  More importantly for the 
purposes of this Comment, OSHA promulgated standards to protect nonem-
ployees from exposure to asbestos traveling outside of a workplace on em-
ployees’ clothing.38  These standards included requirements that employers 
provide special clothing to be used only at the workplace and separate clothes 
                                                 
 27.  See infra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 28.  See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 29.  See infra Part I.A. 
 30.  See infra Part II. 
 31.  See Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 292 (Cal. 2016) (explaining the history of 
take-home knowledge prior to the 1972 OSHA regulations).  
 32.  Id. at 292–93. 
 33.  See infra Part I.B. 
 34.  See infra Part I.C. 
 35.  See infra Part I.D. 
 36.  29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(h) (2016); Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. 
11318 (June 7, 1972). 
 37.  Standard for Exposure to Asbestos Dust, 37 Fed. Reg. at 11,321.  
 38.  Id.  
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lockers to prevent contamination of street clothes.39  The regulations also re-
quired employers to notify third party launderers of any asbestos contamina-
tion and to transport contaminated clothing in “sealed impermeable bags, or 
other closed, impermeable containers.”40  In short, they established work-
place procedures for handling asbestos and provided employers with at least 
constructive knowledge of the danger that existed from asbestos exposure 
away from the jobsite. 
Shortly after OSHA released these regulations, Borel v. Fibreboard Pa-
per Products Corp.41 marked the beginning of a wave of asbestos-related lit-
igation that would flood the American judicial system.42  In Borel, the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendants—various building materials manufacturers for 
whom he had worked as a contractor—should be held negligent, grossly neg-
ligent, and strictly liable because they knew that asbestos carried health risks 
but failed to warn the plaintiff of these dangers.43  The jury found all but two 
of the defendants were negligent, none of the defendants were grossly negli-
gent, and the plaintiff himself had acted contributorily negligent.44  For strict 
liability, the jury found that all defendants were liable and determined that 
the total damages should be $79,436.24.45  The Fifth Circuit affirmed the jury 
verdict, holding that that the defendants breached their duty by failing to warn 
the plaintiffs about the foreseeable dangers associated with asbestos.46  This 
decision seemed to alert plaintiffs and trial lawyers alike to the potential value 
in asbestos-related suits.47  When combined with the ubiquity with which as-
bestos was being used in certain industries, asbestos-related claims increased 
rapidly.48 
                                                 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 42.  See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 2519, at *12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 17, 2004) (explaining that the “intermittent trickle of asbestos litigation became a rushing tide 
as a result of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.”).  
 43.  Borel, 493 F.2d at 1086.  
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.  “Since four defendants originally named in the complaint had previously settled, pay-
ing a total of $20,902.20, the trial court gave full credit for the sums paid in settlement and held the 
remaining six defendants jointly and several[ly] liable for the balance of $58,534.04.”  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 1103 (“Here, there was a duty to speak, but the defendants remained silent.”).  
 47.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.   
 48.  See In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The story of [the 
defendant] sounds a familiar refrain in the asbestos world. . . .  By the mid-1970s, [the defendant] 
was receiving a few hundred asbestos-related claims per year.  That number grew to 19,000 annual 
cases by 1990, and jumped again to over 79,000 cases by 2002.”).  
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B.  Duty as a Determinant: How State Courts’ Conception of Duty 
Affects Employer Liability for Take-Home Asbestos Exposure 
While courts have been relatively clear regarding liability for workplace 
exposure to asbestos,49 the question of an employer’s liability for take-home 
asbestos exposure is distinctly muddled.50  The inconsistency derives largely 
from the variance in the states’ conceptions regarding the determination of 
duty.51  There are a growing number of states which have ruled on employer 
or premises-owner liability in secondary exposure cases and their courts have 
used two primary approaches to determine an employer’s duty to an injured 
party:52 the foreseeability of harm or the relationship between the employer 
and the injured party.53  This Part will explain these two theories and examine 
how they affect employer or premises-owner liability for take-home asbestos 
exposure. 
1.  Foreseeability of Harm 
Many jurisdictions which have tackled the issue of secondary exposure 
determined duty through the lens of foreseeability of harm. Specifically, state 
appellate courts in Tennessee,54 Louisiana,55 Washington,56 New Jersey,57 
California,58 and Illinois,59 as well as the Sixth60 and Eleventh61 Circuits of 
the United States Court of Appeals, have all used foreseeability in determin-
ing whether the employer had a duty to prevent secondary exposure. 
                                                 
 49.  See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1103 (holding that the tort principle assessing liability for foreseea-
ble harm caused by negligence extends to occupational diseases like asbestosis).  
 50.  See infra notes 54–61, 87–95 and accompanying text; see also Satterfield v. Breeding In-
sulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 361 (Tenn. 2008) (“Courts across the country have disagreed as to 
how these broad principles of tort law should be used to determine whether an employer owes a 
duty to persons who develop asbestos-related illnesses after exposure to asbestos fibers on its em-
ployees’ clothing.”).  
 51.  Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 361. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 374–75. 
 55.  Chaisson v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 189–90 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 56.  Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS 2392, at 
*7 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007).  
 57.  Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006). 
 58.  Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 288 (Cal. 2016). 
 59.  Simpkins v. CSX Transp., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 1092, 1099 (Ill. 2012). 
 60.  Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 444 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying Ken-
tucky law).  
 61.  Bobo v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 855 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2017) (applying Alabama 
law).  
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Courts have predominantly used the 1972 OSHA regulations62 to deter-
mine whether employers or premises owners had at least constructive 
knowledge of the effects of secondary asbestos exposure beyond the worksite 
or premises.63  In Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co.,64 the Supreme Court 
of Tennessee recognized that the OSHA regulations were promulgated prior 
to when the secondary exposure contamination had occurred.65  Therefore, 
they found that the defendant should have known that exposure to asbestos 
created a substantial health risk.66  Because the company “used materials con-
taining asbestos in its manufacturing . . . [and knew] that high volumes of 
asbestos fibers were being deposited on its employees’ work clothes,” the 
court held that the defendant had a duty to prevent the foreseeable injury.67 
Likewise, in Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority,68 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit interpreted Alabama negligence 
law to conclude that foreseeability was the critical factor in determining 
whether a defendant owes a duty to a plaintiff.69  The plaintiffs in this case 
were the daughters of the deceased Barbara Bobo, who died of mesothelioma 
resulting from secondary exposure to asbestos.70  Bobo’s husband was ex-
posed to asbestos dust during his work as a laborer for the Tennessee Valley 
Authority (“TVA”) from 1975 to 1997 and brought the asbestos home on his 
work clothes.71 Bobo would wash the asbestos-laden work clothes twice each 
week, unknowingly inhaling dangerous concentrations of asbestos fibers.72  
The court pointed to the 1972 OSHA regulations, as well as OSHA regula-
tions later enacted, in determining that TVA knew or should have known that 
for health reasons, it should prevent asbestos fibers from leaving the worksite 
on employees’ clothes.73  The court explained that it was foreseeable that 
Bobo would be endangered by take-home asbestos, and thus TVA violated 
their duty to her.74 
                                                 
 62.  See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.  
 63.  See e.g., Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar, 432 Md. 523, 537–39, 69 A.3d 1028, 1037–39 
(2013); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tenn. 2008); Chaisson v. 
Avondale Indust. Inc., 947 So. 2d 171, 183 (La. Ct. App. 2006); see also Bobo, 855 F.3d at 1299.  
But see Martin, 561 F.3d at 445 (noting that the plaintiff’s expert testimony indicated that the first 
studies of “bystander exposure” were published in 1965). 
 64.  266 S.W.3d 347 (Tenn. 2008). 
 65.  Id. at 353.  
 66.  Id. at 374–75. 
 67.  Id. at 369, 375.  
 68.  855 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 69.  Id. at 1303.  
 70.  Id. at 1297–98. 
 71.  Id. at 1298. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. at 1299, 1305.  
 74.  Id. at 1305.  
 2018] TAKE-HOME TOXIN 1173 
 
Conversely, in Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.,75 the Sixth Cir-
cuit assessed what the defendants should have known regarding the risks of 
asbestos exposure that took place between 1937 and 1963.76  After initially 
determining that the defendant had no actual knowledge of the danger of sec-
ondary exposure, the court explored whether the defendant should have 
known.77  The plaintiff submitted an expert report and a treatise positing that 
the secondary exposure was “scientifically knowable since the 1950’s.”78  
However, the court reasoned that this was insufficient to prove that the de-
fendant should have known the dangers of secondary asbestos exposure.  The 
court distinguished this case from other cases where the court had found con-
structive knowledge because those cases occurred after the promulgation of 
the 1972 OSHA regulations.79  Similarly, in Simpkins v. CSX Transportation, 
Inc.,80 the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that “every person owes a duty 
of ordinary care to all others to guard against injuries which naturally flow as 
a reasonably probable and foreseeable consequence of an act . . . [and that 
duty] extends to remote and unknown persons.”81  However, since the expo-
sure in this case occurred prior to the OSHA standards’ promulgation, the 
court noted that the plaintiff’s allegation of foreseeability was conclusory and 
did not contain sufficient facts to prove that the defendant knew or should 
have known of the risk.82  As a result, the court remanded the case for further 
fact-finding.83 
                                                 
 75.  561 F.3d 439 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying Kentucky law). 
 76.  Id. at 444. 
 77.  Id. at 444–45.  
 78.  Id. at 445 (quoting a report included in the record). 
 79.  Id. at 446, n.3.  
 80.  965 N.E.2d 1092 (Ill. 2012). 
 81.  Id. at 1097 (quoting Widlowski v. Durkee Foods, 562 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Ill. 1990)).  
 82.  Id. at 1099. 
 83.  Id.  The Illinois high court appeared to be overturning lower court conceptions of duty 
based on relationships.  See Estate of Holmes v. Pneumo Abex, LLC, 955 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2011) (finding that there was no duty because the defendant did not have a legal relation-
ship with the victim of secondhand asbestos); Nelson v. Aurora Equip. Co., 909 N.E.2d 931, 938–
39 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (concluding that the defendant owed no duty for lack of a legal relationship).  
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Courts that have applied a foreseeability test to determine duty have 
done so in a fact intensive way.84  Under the foreseeability test, the determi-
nate of liability largely depends on when the exposure took place.85  After 
OSHA promulgated its 1972 regulations, courts largely accepted that the 
risks of asbestos exposure were sufficiently known.86  Thus, in courts inte-
grating foreseeability into their liability analysis, any exposure after 1972 
will most likely lead to liability for the employer or premises owner. 
2.  Relationship Between the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
Unsurprisingly, states that have consistently found the employer not li-
able for secondary asbestos exposure have analyzed duty through the prism 
of the parties’ relationship.  State courts in Maryland,87 Pennsylvania,88 Geor-
gia,89 New York,90 Michigan,91 Texas,92 Iowa,93 Ohio,94 and Arizona95 have 
all found that the defendant did not have a duty under either a negligence or 
a premises liability claim because there was no relationship between the em-
ployer or premises owner and the secondarily exposed party. 
Many courts have cited policy concerns in their decisions not to extend 
the duty of an employer past the employee.96  In Adams v. Owens-Illinois, 
Inc.,97 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that the defendant “owed 
                                                 
 84.  See, e.g., Bobo v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 855 F.3d 1294, 1305 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining 
“[t]he record show[ed] that TVA knew about OSHA regulations that were adopted to protect not 
only workers but also their families”); Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 445–46 
(6th Cir. 2009) (emphasizing that reports at the time of the exposure were insufficient to establish 
that the employer could or should have foreseen the dangers of secondary exposure to asbestos); 
Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tenn. 2008) (noting that the employee 
worked for the employer after 1972 and analyzing the steps the employer took to minimize exposure 
outside the workplace).  
 85.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 86.  See, e.g., Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 292 (Cal. 2016); Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d 
at 353. 
 87.  Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 119 Md. App. 395, 411, 705 A.2d 58, 66 (1998). 
 88.  Gillen v. Boeing Co., 40 F. Supp. 3d 534, 540, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (applying Pennsylvania 
law).  
 89.  CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 210 (Ga. 2005). 
 90.  In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 840 N.E.2d 115, 122 (N.Y. 2005). 
 91.  In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Tex., 740 N.W.2d 206, 
222 (Mich. 2007). 
 92.  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Altimore, 256 S.W.3d 415, 425 (Tex. App. 2008). 
 93.  Van Fossen v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 698–99 (Iowa 2009). 
 94.  Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 929 N.E.2d 448, 452–53 (Ohio 2010).  
 95.  Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc., 382 P.3d 75, 82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).  
 96.  See, e.g., Van Fossen, 777 N.W.2d at 698–99 (holding that if employers were to bear an 
unlimited general duty to exercise reasonable care on matters involving asbestos, the “universe of 
potential persons to whom the duty might be owed is unlimited”).  
 97.  119 Md. App. 395, 705 A.2d 58 (1998). 
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no duty to strangers based upon providing a safe workplace for employees.”98  
The court hypothesized that if they allowed employer liability to reach an 
employee’s wife, it might create a precedent that could extend liability to 
anyone who comes in close contact with the employee, drastically expanding 
the scope of liability.99 
In Gillen v. Boeing Co.,100 this question of whether an employer or 
premises owner owed a duty of care to an employee’s spouse regarding as-
bestos exposure reached the Pennsylvania appellate courts for the first 
time.101  In Pennsylvania, notions of duty in a negligence case are “rooted in 
public policy,” which requires weighing certain factors.102  While the most 
prominent factor is the relationship between the parties, courts do look to 
others, including the overall public interest in the proposed solution.103  In 
looking to the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, the court 
found that since the exposure did not occur on the defendant’s premises, the 
plaintiff and the defendant were essentially “legal strangers” under the law 
of negligence.104  The court further reasoned that imposing liability for take-
home exposure to a party that the defendant was not in contact with would 
make liability “essentially . . . infinite.”105  Mirroring the Maryland court’s 
reasoning in Adams, the court here cited precedent in explaining that they 
must draw lines and create boundaries in order to prevent unlimited liability 
to an unlimited number of plaintiffs.106 
Additionally, in Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc.,107 the Arizona intermediate appel-
late court decided as a matter of first impression that there is no duty in take-
home exposure cases.108  The court explicitly stated that duty does not turn 
                                                 
 98.  Id. at 411, 705 A.2d at 66. 
 99.  Id.  The court specifically expressed wariness at the idea of extending liability to “other 
family members, automobile passengers, and co-workers.”  Id.  
 100.  40 F. Supp. 3d 534 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
 101.  Id. at 537–38.  
 102.  Id. at 538 (quoting R.W. v. Manzek, 888 A.2d 740, 746 (Pa. 2001). 
 103.  Id.  The court also looks to “the social utility of the actor’s conduct; . . . the nature of the 
risk imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; . . . [and] the consequences of imposing a duty 
upon the actor.”  Id. (quoting Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166, 1168–69 (Pa. 2000)).  
While the test includes foreseeability, the court made clear that it “‘is not alone determinative of the 
duty question’ and ‘is not necessarily a dominant factor’ in the duty assessment under Pennsylvania 
law.”  Id. at 540 (quoting Seebold v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 57 A.3d 1232, 1249 & n.26 (Pa. 
2012)). 
 104.  Id. at 538 (quoting Riedel v. ICI Ams. Inc., 968 A.2d 17, 26–27 (Del. 2009)). 
 105.  Id. at 540.  
 106.  Id. (quoting Toney v. Chester Cty. Hosp., 36 A.3d 83, 91 (Pa. 2011) (per curiam)).  
 107.  382 P.3d 75 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).  
 108.  Id. at 77.  
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on the foreseeability of the harm, but rather, duty exists where there is a re-
lationship between the parties or it is based on public policy considerations.109  
In this case, Ernest V. Quiroz was exposed to asbestos from his father’s work 
clothes during the fourteen years that he lived in his house.110  Quiroz later 
died from mesothelioma, and his decedents brought a negligence action 
against Reynolds Metal Company (Quiroz’s father’s employer), alleging it 
was negligent in not preventing the secondary exposure to the work-site as-
bestos.111  The Arizona court affirmed the trial court’s grant of Reynolds’s 
motion for summary judgment, emphasizing that there was no relationship 
between the parties.112  The court also addressed the public policy consider-
ations113 but found them insufficient in finding a duty.114  Specifically, the 
court expressed wariness about creating a duty which would spawn infinite 
liability and result in a proliferation of claims.115  Ultimately, they found that 
the potential drawbacks of creating a duty of care for take-home exposure 
outweighed any potential benefits and declined to impose one.116 
Finally, in In re Certified Question from the Fourteenth District Court 
of Appeals of Texas,117 the Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged the ex-
istence of an asbestos-litigation crisis as a result of the “‘elephantine mass of 
asbestos cases’ lodged in state and federal courts.”118  With this in mind, the 
court found that recognizing a cause of action based solely on exposure, with-
out defining a more specified duty, would “create a potentially limitless pool 
of plaintiffs” and further exacerbate the problem.119  The court relied on this 
concern as a major reason for finding that the defendant owed no duty to the 
nonemployee plaintiff.120 
                                                 
 109.  Id. at 77–78. 
 110.  Id. at 77. 
 111.  Id.  
 112.  Id. at 78.  The court discussed both a special relationship, which is based on contract, family 
relations, or conduct undertaken by the defendant and a categorical relationship, recognized by com-
mon law, such as landowner-invitee.  Id.  It explained that clearly neither applied in this case.  Id. 
 113.  Arizona courts use the following list of public policy factors: “[t]he reasonable expecta-
tions of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or 
insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting 
the expansion or limitation of new channels of liability.”  Id. at 80 (quoting Bloxham v. Glock Inc., 
53 P.3d 196, 200 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)).  
 114.  Id. at 80–81. 
 115.  Id.  
 116.  Id. at 81.  
 117.  740 N.W.2d 206 (Mich. 2007). 
 118.  Id. at 219 (quoting Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 166 (2003)).  
 119.  Id. at 220 (quoting Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 684, 694 (Mich. 2005)).  
 120.  Id. at 221–22.  
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Whether based on policy concerns about increased litigation from sec-
ondary exposure plaintiffs, or simply an adherence to common law concep-
tions against extending liability, states that have not found that employers or 
premises owners owe a duty of care outside of employees or invitees regu-
larly find in favor of defendants in secondary exposure cases.121  In treating 
this decision as a matter of law rather than engaging in factual inquiries, the 
decisions under this duty regime have been markedly more unified than those 
decisions in jurisdictions that rely on foreseeability.122 
C.  Maryland’s Take-Home Jurisprudence 
In Maryland’s first secondary exposure case, Adams v. Owens-Illi-
nois,123 the Court of Special Appeals heard an appeal of nine consolidated 
asbestos cases.124  Only one of the consolidated claims dealt with secondary 
exposure, and it was brought by the Estate of Mary Wild against Bethlehem 
Steel Company.125  Mary Wild died of asbestosis allegedly contracted as a 
result of handling and washing her husband’s clothing that contained asbes-
tos.126  The trial court found that Bethlehem Steel was not liable and the ap-
peal was brought on the grounds that the trial judge failed to properly instruct 
the jury on the employer’s duty to maintain a safe workplace for its employ-
ees.127  The appellants argued that the trial judge erred in not issuing Proposed 
Instruction 44 to the Jury.  This instruction would have explained the duties 
that an employer owes their employees.128 
The Court of Special Appeals found the trial court properly refused Pro-
posed Instruction 44.129  It reasoned that because Mary Wild was not an em-
ployee of Bethlehem Steel, it was not necessary to read instructions regarding 
                                                 
 121.  See supra notes 87–95 and accompanying text. 
 122.  See supra Part I.B.1.  
 123.  119 Md. App. 395, 705 A.2d 58 (1998). 
 124.  Id. at 398, 705 A.2d at 60.  
 125.  Id. at 399–400, 705 A.2d at 60–61.  
 126.  Id. at 407, 705 A.2d at 65.  
 127.  Id. at 410, 705 A.2d at 66.  The trial judge instructed the jury that “[u]nder Maryland law, 
to establish a cause of action in negligence against Bethlehem, the plaintiffs must prove the exist-
ence of all four of the following elements: [duty, breach, causation, and harm].”  Id.  
 128.  Proposed Instruction 44 stated:  
An employer has the duty to use reasonable care and diligence to furnish his employees 
with a reasonably safe place to work.  An employer has the affirmative duty in a master-
servant relationship to provide his employee with a reasonably safe place in which to 
work and to warn and instruct his employee concerning the dangers of the work known 
to him which are not obvious and cannot be discovered by the exercise of reasonable care 
by the employee. 
Id. 
 129.  Id. at 411, 705 A.2d at 66. 
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Bethlehem’s duty to employees.130  The court emphasized that the trial 
judge’s instruction that Mary Wild needed to show that Bethlehem owed her 
a duty and that they breached that duty, were sufficient.131  It reasoned further 
that if it found Bethlehem liable for Mary Wild’s exposure to asbestos while 
handling her husband’s clothing, Bethlehem would owe a duty to all others 
who came in close contact with her husband, including other family mem-
bers, car passengers, and co-workers.132  Thus, the court made clear that Beth-
lehem’s duty to provide a safe workplace for employees did not extend to 
“strangers” with whom it did not have an employment relationship.133 
The Maryland Court of Appeals addressed the issue of take-home expo-
sure in Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar,134 where the claim was brought based 
on a theory of products liability.135  The plaintiff lived in a home with her 
grandfather—whose job included insulating pipes using asbestos-containing 
Georgia Pacific products—from infancy in the early 1950s until she married 
in 1974.136  Though her grandfather wore street clothes to and from work, he 
stored his work clothes in his car during the week then brought them home 
every weekend to be shaken out and washed.137  As the plaintiff got older, 
she regularly washed her grandfather’s clothes.138  Ultimately, she was diag-
nosed with mesothelioma and brought suit against Georgia Pacific (and var-
ious other companies).139 
The trial court found that there was duty owed and entered a judgment 
against Georgia Pacific for over five million dollars in damages.140  Georgia 
Pacific appealed, alleging that they had no duty to warn the plaintiff, but the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.141  
                                                 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Id. (“If liability for exposure to asbestos could be premised on Mary Wild’s handling of 
her husband’s clothing, presumably Bethlehem would owe a duty to others who came in close con-
tact with [her husband], including other family members, automobile passengers, and co-workers.”).  
 133.  Id.  
 134.  432 Md. 523, 69 A.3d 1028 (2013).  The Court of Appeals characterized this case as “an-
other in a growing line of cases in which a household member contracted mesothelioma, allegedly 
from exposure to asbestos fibers brought into the home on the clothing of another household mem-
ber who was exposed to asbestos-laden products in the course of his employment.”  Id. at 525, 69 
A.3d at 1030. 
 135.  Id. at 525, 69 A.3d at 1030. 
 136.  Id.  
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  Id. at 525–26, 69 A.3d at 1030.  
 140.  Id. at 526, 69 A.3d at 1030.  
 141.  Id.  
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However, the Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Georgia Pa-
cific did not have a duty to warn the plaintiff.142  In reaching this holding, the 
court focused on a list of factors used to determine whether a duty exists.143  
The court acknowledged that the first factor, foreseeability of harm, “may be 
the most important of those factors” but that it is not necessarily dispositive 
in determining liability.144  In analyzing whether foreseeability was sufficient 
for liability in this case, the court stated that “the connection between lung 
disease and exposure to asbestos dust brought into the home on the clothing 
of workers was not generally recognized until at least [the 1960s].”145  The 
court cited the OSHA safety regulations promulgated in 1972 and indicated 
that these regulations made the danger to household members foreseeable.146  
Since the exposures in this case took place in 1968–69, the court found that 
the Court of Special Appeals erred in assigning Georgia Pacific a duty to 
warn the plaintiff “of the danger of exposure to the dust on her grandfather’s 
clothes.”147 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has not heard a take-home asbestos ex-
posure claim based on an employer-employee relationship.148  In Doe v. 
Pharmacia & Upjohn Co.,149 however, the Court of Appeals dealt directly 
with the question of whether an employer has a duty to a family member of 
their employee in a context separate from asbestos exposure.150  Similarly, in 
Dehn v. Edgecombe,151 the Court of Appeals addressed whether a doctor 
                                                 
 142.  Id., 69 A.3d at 1030–31.  Importantly, the court noted that the products liability actions 
required a showing of the same elements as a standard negligence action.  Id. at 528, 69 A.3d at 
1031–32.  
 143.  Id. at 529, 69 A.3d at 1032 (identifying the factors as “[t]he foreseeability of harm to the 
plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered the injury, the closeness of the connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defend-
ant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for 
breach, and the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved” (quoting Patton 
v. USA Rugby Football, 381 Md. 627, 637, 851 A.2d 566, 571 (2004))).  
 144.  Id. at 530, 69 A.3d at 1033.  
 145.  Id. at 534, 69 A.3d at 1035.  The court disagreed with the analysis of an earlier Court of 
Special Appeals decision, Anchor Packing Co. v. Grimshaw, 115 Md. App. 134, 692 A.2d 5 (1997).  
Id.  The Grimshaw court, similarly dealing with a products liability claim, focused exclusively on 
foreseeability and found the manufacturer had a duty since it was “known in the industry since 
1930 . . . that it is important for workers not to bring toxic substances home on their clothing and 
thereby expose their families to it.”  Id. at 533–34, 69 A.3d at 1035 (quoting Grimshaw, 115 Md. 
App. at 194, 692 A.2d at 35).   
 146.  Id. at 538, 69 A.3d at 1037.  
 147.  Id. at 541, 69 A.3d at 1039.  
 148.  The Georgia Pacific case was brought against the manufacturer of the asbestos-containing 
product, not the employer.  See supra text accompanying note 139. 
 149.  388 Md. 407, 879 A.2d 1088 (2005).  
 150.  Id.  
 151.  384 Md. 606, 865 A.2d 603 (2005). 
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owed a duty to his patient’s wife.152  These cases are cited in past secondary 
exposure decisions,153 and they hold relevance here because they similarly 
deal with whether a duty exists to a secondarily harmed party.  In Pharmacia, 
the plaintiff’s husband was a laboratory technician working with two strains 
of HIV.  For one of the strains, the employer’s testing procedures were inad-
equate, meaning there was no way to know whether or not the employee had 
contracted HIV.154  As a result, the employee unknowingly became infected 
with HIV.155  The employee’s wife then became infected with HIV through 
sexual contact with her husband.156  As a result, Doe’s wife brought a tort 
claim against Pharmacia, arguing that they owed her a duty of care based on 
the foreseeable risk of her contracting HIV from her husband.157  The court 
acknowledged that it was foreseeable that the employee could pass the dis-
ease to his wife.158  However, because Ms. Doe had no relationship with Phar-
macia, it found that foreseeability alone was not enough in this context where 
extending the duty past the employer-employee relationship would risk cre-
ating a new indeterminate class of potential plaintiffs.159  The court rejected 
Ms. Doe’s argument that duty should be limited to spouses, reasoning “[t]he 
rationale for imposing a duty of care to Ms. Doe could apply to all sexual 
partners of employees.”160 
Similarly, in Dehn, the Court of Appeals refused to extend the doctor-
patient duty to the patient’s spouse.161  In this case, the doctor told the patient 
that his vasectomy operation was successful and that he could engage in un-
protected sex without impregnating his partner.162 However, shortly thereaf-
ter, the patient’s wife did in fact become pregnant as a result of the unpro-
tected sex with the patient.  The patient’s wife sued the doctor for 
negligence.163  She argued that the doctor’s duty extended to her since it was 
                                                 
 152.  Id. at 610, 865 A.2d at 605.  
 153.  See, e.g., Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar, 432 Md. 523, 528, 69 A.3d 1028, 1032 (2013); 
Hiett v. AC&R Insulation Co., No. 2564, 2017 Md. App. LEXIS 100, at *6, *12, *25 (Ct. Spec. 
App. Jan. 27, 2017).  
 154.  Pharmacia, 388 Md. at 410–12, 879 A.2d at 1089–91. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 412, 879 A.2d at 1091.  
 158.  Id. at 416–17, 879 A.2d at 1093. 
 159.  Id. at 420, 879 A.2d at 1095.  
 160.  Id. at 421, 879 A.2d at 1096.  
 161.  384 Md. 606, 623, 865 A.2d 603, 612 (2005).  In a doctor-patient relationship, duty auto-
matically is owed by the doctor to the patient.  See id. at 615, 865 A.2d at 608.  
 162.  Id. at 613–14, 865 A.2d at 607.  It is noteworthy in this case that the defendant, Dr. 
Edgecombe, did not perform the vasectomy—he merely vouched for its effectiveness.  Id. at 611, 
865 A.2d at 606.  While the court did identify this fact in its reasoning, the crux of its holding dealt 
with the idea that extending a duty to an employee’s spouse could “expand traditional tort concepts 
beyond manageable bounds.”  Id. at 627, 865 A.2d at 615.  
 163.  Id. at 618, 865 A.2d at 610. 
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highly foreseeable that she would have sexual intercourse with her husband 
and would therefore be affected by the doctor’s erroneous statement regard-
ing the effectiveness of the procedure.164  The court rejected this argument 
and found that there was no duty, again leaning on the policy of resisting the 
expansion of tort liability.165  Specifically, the court said, “[t]he rationale for 
extending the duty would apply to all potential sexual partners and expand 
the universe of potential plaintiffs.”166 
D.  Kesner v. Superior Court: The California Court Extends Employer 
Duty Only to Household Members of the Employee 
1.  Background and Procedural History 
The Supreme Court of California consolidated two cases from separate 
districts of the Court of Appeals of California for review.167  In Kesner v. 
Superior Court,168 the First Appellate District Court of California ruled on 
whether an employer has a duty to prevent secondary exposure of asbestos to 
its employees.169  The case concerned Johnny Blaine Kesner, who was diag-
nosed with peritoneal mesothelioma in 2011.170  Kesner filed suit against sev-
eral defendants, including Pneumo Abex LLC (“Abex”), to recover damages 
for his injuries.171  The basis of the claim against Abex was that Kesner’s 
uncle—an employee of the company172—was exposed to high levels of as-
bestos in the course of his work.173  Kesner—who was very close with his 
uncle and stayed at his house about three days a week—alleged that he was 
exposed to asbestos through the dust on his uncle’s clothing and that this 
                                                 
 164.  Id. at 624, 865 A.2d at 614. 
 165.  Id. at 627, 865 A.2d at 615.  
 166.  Id.  
 167.  Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 288–89 (Cal. 2016).   
 168.  171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 811 (Ct. App. 2014).  
 169.  Id. at 812–13.  
 170.  Id. at 813.  Peritoneal mesothelioma is “the second most common type of mesothelioma,” 
and it “occurs in the abdomen, on the surface of the omentum and visceral organs.”  About Perito-
neal Mesothelioma: A Form of Abdominal Mesothelioma, MESOTHELIOMA APPLIED RESEARCH 
FOUNDATION, http://www.cure-
meso.org/site/c.duIWJfNQKiL8G/b.8578883/k.931C/Types_of_Mesothelioma__Peritoneal_Mes-
othelioma.htm (last visited May 2, 2018).  Peritoneal mesothelioma is often referred to as “ab-
dominal mesothelioma.”  Id. 
 171.  Kesner, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 813.  “Kesner’s claims were resolved against all other defend-
ants, all of which apparently were companies (or their successors) for which Kesner was himself 
employed and exposed to asbestos at their premises.”  Id.  Pneumo-Abex was the real party of 
interest in this case.  Id. at 811. 
 172.  “Kesner’s uncle was employed by Abex from 1973 to 2007.”  Id. at 812. 
 173.  Id. at 813.  “The uncle allegedly came home in his work clothes covered in asbestos dust.”  
Id. 
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contributed to him contracting mesothelioma.174  At trial, Abex moved for a 
nonsuit, citing Campbell v. Ford Motor Co.175 for the proposition “that it had 
no legal duty to” Kesner.176 The trial court agreed, granting Abex’s motion 
for nonsuit and entering a final judgment in its favor.177 
On appeal, the First District of the California Court of Appeal re-
versed.178  In reversing, the court distinguished this case from Campbell be-
cause Kesner was based on negligent manufacturing of an asbestos-contain-
ing product rather than premises liability.179  Instead, the court cited the 
factors outlined in Rowland v. Christian180 as determinative that Abex’s duty 
of care did extend to Kesner, as he was a long-term guest in the home of its 
employee, and therefore, his secondary exposure to asbestos was foreseea-
ble.181  The court noted this holding only established that a duty existed in 
this case, and the other aspects of the negligence claim must still be proven.182 
In the second case, Haver v. BNSF Railway Co.,183 the surviving family 
members (“Havers”) of Lynn Haver (“Lynn”) filed a wrongful death action 
against BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) on a theory of premises liability 
after Lynn died of mesothelioma brought on by secondary asbestos expo-
sure.184  Lynn’s former husband Mike Haver (“Mike”) was employed by the 
Santa Fe Railway.185  Through the course of his work, Mike was directly ex-
posed to asbestos which adhered to his clothing and was transmitted to their 
                                                 
 174.  Id.  Between 1973 and 1979, Kesner visited his uncle often, staying at his house an average 
of three days a week.  Id. at 813 n.2.   
 175.  141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).  
 176.  Kesner, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 813 (citing Campbell, 141 Cal. Rep. 3d at 405). 
 177.  Id. at 813–14.  The trial court held that “Abex owed Kesner no duty for his exposure to 
asbestos resulting from Kesner’s contact with its employee.”  Id. at 814.   
 178.  Id. at 814, 819.  
 179.  The court asserted that the premises liability claim in Campbell was based on the defend-
ant’s “passive involvement as owner of the plant in which an independent contractor was installing 
asbestos insulation,” whereas Kesner’s claim was not based on “a theory of premises liability but 
on a claim of negligence in the manufacture of asbestos-containing brake linings” by Abex them-
selves.  Id. at 816. 
 180.  443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).  The factors are: 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and 
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of 
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to 
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, 
and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.   
Id. at 564. 
 181.  Kesner, 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 817–19.  
 182.  Id. at 819.  
 183.  172 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771 (Ct. App. 2014).  
 184.  Id. at 772.  
 185.  Santa Fe Railway was the predecessor to defendant BNSF Railway Company.  Id.  
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home, where Lynn was also exposed to it.186  As a result, Lynn suffered from 
throat cancer and progressive lung disease, which ultimately caused her 
death.187  BNSF demurred, similarly relying on Campbell to argue that it had 
no duty to Lynn as a matter of law in a premises liability action.188  The trial 
court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.189 
On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision, concluding that 
BNSF owed no duty of care to Lynn.190  In affirming, the majority rejected 
the Havers’ arguments that the case at bar was distinguishable from Camp-
bell,191 that Campbell was incorrectly decided,192 and that the decision in Kes-
ner193 compelled a finding of error on the part of the trial court.194  In dissent, 
Judge Mink argued that the Rowland factors should have been applied and 
that this would have resulted in a finding that BNSF did owe a duty to 
Lynn.195  Judge Mink pointed to the decisions of many out-of-state cases on 
liability for take-home asbestos exposure and asserted that while courts 
throughout the country are divided on this issue, the majority of courts which 
view duty primarily through the prism of foreseeability—as California 
does—find that there is a duty.196  Additionally, Judge Mink argued that the 
majority incorrectly accepted the Campbell rationale that public policy con-
siderations counsel against finding a duty so as not to inundate courts with 
                                                 
 186.  Id. at 772–73. 
 187.  Id. at 773.  
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at 772.  
 190.  Id. at 776. 
 191.  The Havers asserted that Campbell was “limited to a plaintiff who was the relative of work-
ers employed by an independent contractor,” and could not be applied where the workers were 
controlled directly by the property owner.  Id. at 774.  The court disagreed, asserting that the Camp-
bell decision mentioned only “workers,” which meant both those employed by the property owner 
and those employed by independent contractors.  Id.  Additionally, the majority noted that the 
Campbell court made it “unequivocally clear that ‘[its] analysis [did] not turn on this distinction.’”  
Id. at 775 (quoting Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 402 n.6 (Ct. App. 2012).  
 192.  The court cited similar rulings from other jurisdictions to find that the Campbell decision 
was correct and in line with traditional tort law.  Id.  
 193.  See supra note 179.  The Kesner decision came after oral arguments in this appeal.  Haver, 
172 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 776. 
 194.  The majority disregards Kesner since it was decided based on negligence, not premises 
liability.  Id. at 776. 
 195.  Id. at 777 (Mink, J., dissenting). 
 196.  Id.  Judge Mink stated that California and most states which find liability view duty through 
the prism of foreseeability, whereas those states that do not find liability focus on the relationship 
between the parties to determine duty.  Id.   
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lawsuits.197  Judge Mink suggested that the public policy considerations ac-
tually suggest imposing a duty, because society does not benefit by allowing 
wrongdoers to avoid consequences for their tortious conduct.198 
The Supreme Court of California granted certiorari and consolidated the 
two cases to determine whether employers or landowners owe a duty of care 
to prevent secondary exposure to asbestos.199 
2.  The Court’s Reasoning 
In Kesner v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of California held that 
employers have a duty to prevent exposure to asbestos carried by their em-
ployees to members of that employee’s household.200  The court initially es-
tablished California law mandates a general duty on all persons to exercise 
reasonable care for the safety of others,201 and this duty exists unless there is 
a statutory provision establishing an exception or where an exception is 
“clearly supported by public policy.”202  Since there is no such statutory pro-
vision, the court looked to the Rowland factors203 to determine whether a 
public policy exception should be created.204 
The court separated the Rowland factors into two categories: those that 
address the foreseeability of the relevant injury—“foreseeability, certainty, 
and the connection between plaintiff and defendant”—and those that measure 
whether public policy interests support excluding relief for certain types of 
plaintiffs or injuries—“moral blame, preventing future harm, burden, and 
availability of insurance.”205  The court started by analyzing the first category 
of factors and noted that foreseeability itself is the single most important fac-
                                                 
 197.  Id.  
 198.  Id. (citing In re Certified Question for Fourteenth Dist. Court of Appeals of Texas, 740 
N.W.2d 206, 229 (Mich. 2007) (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting)).  
 199.  Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 288 (Cal. 2016). 
 200.  Id.  
 201.  Id. at 289–90 (“Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, 
but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the man-
agement of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of 
ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) 
(West 2009))).  
 202.  Id. at 290 (quoting Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1174 (Cal. 2011)). 
 203.  See supra note 180.   
 204.  Kesner, 384 P.3d at 290.  The court also noted that the Rowland factors should be applied 
generally, stating that the determination to be made is “not whether they support an exception to the 
general duty of reasonable care on the facts of the particular case before us, but whether carving out 
an entire category of cases from that general duty rule is justified by clear considerations of policy.”  
Id. (quoting Cabral, 248 P.3d at 1175). 
 205.  Id. at 291.  
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tor to consider when determining whether to create an exception to the gen-
eral duty rule.206  The court concluded that foreseeability weighed heavily in 
favor of finding a duty toward employees’ household members because “it 
was foreseeable that people who work with or around asbestos may carry 
asbestos fibers home with them and expose members of their household.”207  
The court further cited existing health regulations which highlighted the po-
tential risks of asbestos contamination outside the workplace208 as evidence 
that such harm through secondary exposure in the home was known and 
therefore foreseeable.209 
In considering the second factor, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the court stated that since mesothelioma was the cause of 
death for both the decedents, “their injuries are certain and compensable un-
der the law.”210  The court leaned on foreseeability again in its analysis of the 
third factor211—the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s con-
duct and the injury suffered—to reject BNSF’s argument that the connection 
was too attenuated because it “relies on the intervening acts of a defendant’s 
employee to transmit the alleged asbestos risk to the plaintiff.”212  The court 
reasoned the connection was not too attenuated because the workers return-
ing home with asbestos dust on their clothing was “predictable and derivative 
of the alleged misconduct, namely, failure to control the movement of asbes-
tos fibers.”213  Thus, the court found the closeness of the connection between 
the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered to weigh heavily in favor of 
a determination of duty as well.214 
                                                 
 206.  Id.; see supra note 201.  
 207.  Kesner, 384 P.3d at 291.  The court further noted that foreseeability does not deal with a 
particular defendant’s conduct, “but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of neg-
ligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability 
may appropriately be imposed.  Id. (quoting Cabral, 248 P.3d at 1175).  
 208.  Id. at 291–93 (requiring employers to “provide their asbestos-exposed employees with spe-
cial clothing and changing rooms” (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(b) (2016))).  The court also noted 
that well before the 1972 OSHA regulations were promulgated, the “federal government and indus-
trial hygienists recommended that employers take measures to prevent employees who work with 
toxins from contaminating their families by changing and showering before leaving the workplace.”  
Id. at 292. 
 209.  Id. at 290–91. 
 210.  Id. at 293. 
 211.  “In determining whether one has a duty to prevent injury that is the result of third party 
conduct, the touchstone of the analysis is the foreseeability of that intervening conduct.”  Id. at 294 
(citing Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947, 952 (Cal. 1983) (en banc)). 
 212.  Id. at 293 (citing Cabral, 248 P.3d at 1177–80).  
 213.  Id. at 294. 
 214.  Id.  
 1186 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:1166 
 
After determining that the three Rowland foreseeability factors weighed 
in favor of finding a duty to the secondarily exposed parties, the court ad-
dressed additional policy concerns.215  First, the court identified an interest in 
preventing future harm.216  The court clarified that the duty analysis looks to 
the time when the duty would have been allegedly owed, not to how it would 
prevent future harm from the present day forward.217  Thus, the court asked 
“whether imposing tort liability in the 1970s would have prevented future 
harm from that point.”218  The court found that it would,219 and it determined 
this factor weighed in favor of finding a duty.220  Second, in terms of moral 
blame attached to the defendant, the court asserted since the “commercial 
users of asbestos benefitted financially from their use of asbestos and had 
greater information and control” about and over it than those in the employ-
ees’ households, this factor also weighed in favor of finding a duty.221 
The court merged its analysis of the policy factors regarding availability 
of insurance and the factor concerning balancing the burden to the defendant 
with the costs to the community of finding liability.222  It dismissed the de-
fendant’s argument that finding a duty would increase insurance costs and 
tort damages.223  However, the court acknowledged the merit in the defend-
ant’s contention that finding a duty would open the door to an uncontainable 
pool of applicants and invite “voluminous and frequently meritless claims 
that will overwhelm the courts.”224  It addressed this issue by limiting the 
employer’s or property owner’s duty only to members of a worker’s house-
hold.225  “Household member[s]” are defined as “persons who live with the 
                                                 
 215.  Id. at 294–99. 
 216.  Id. at 295. 
 217.  Id.  For this reason, the court dismissed the defendant’s arguments that since the risk of 
mesothelioma through asbestos exposure has been eliminated through “extensive regulation and 
reduced asbestos usage,” there is not future risk of the injury at issue here.  Id. 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  The court reasoned that the “numerous regulations” enacted at the time suggested that “leg-
islatures and agencies readily adopted the premise that imposing liability would prevent future 
harm.”  Id.  
 220.  Id.  
 221.  Id. at 295–96. 
 222.  The court did note Abex’s contention that insurance for asbestos-related injuries is no 
longer available was misguided, as the proper inquiry was: whether insurance was available to the 
defendants at the time of exposure.  Id. at 296.  
 223.  The court asserted that since employers and premises owners are “best situated” to know 
the dangers of asbestos, they can minimize costs by taking reasonable precautions to avoid injuries.  
Id. at 297 (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., 
concurring)). 
 224.  Id.  
 225.  Id. at 298.  
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worker.”226  The court’s rationale again reflected the importance of foreseea-
bility, as it stressed that workers can be expected to return home each day and 
interact closely with household members, whereas a close contact with a car-
pool companion or a fellow bus rider is more difficult to anticipate.227  While 
acknowledging that the latter contacts may have a legitimate reason to be-
lieve they were exposed to significant quantities of asbestos during their in-
teractions with the worker, the court explained that duty rules inherently ex-
clude some individuals who were harmed by the actions of potential 
defendants.228  The court relied on limiting duty to this class of individuals to 
restrict the potential for a flood of claims which, in turn, would create exten-
sive costs for the courts and the community.229  The court determined that 
proper application of the Rowland factors supported the conclusion that Abex 
and BNSF had a duty of ordinary care to their employees’ household mem-
bers to prevent take-home asbestos exposure.230 
Lastly, the court clarified that this duty applies in both negligence and 
premises liability claims.231  The court rejected BNSF’s argument by explain-
ing that physical or spatial boundaries are not dispositive in defining the 
scope of a property owner’s liability.232  Instead, the court emphasized that 
the duty of care encompasses a duty to avoid exposing people to potential 
injury offsite where the landowner’s property is maintained in a way that 
would lend itself to those injuries.233  Since the risk of injury was caused by 
a hazardous condition created and maintained on BNSF’s property, and not, 
as BNSF tried to argue, by Lynn’s contact with Mike, the court determined 
that the premises liability claim was subject to the same analysis as the claim 
of general negligence.234 
                                                 
 226.  Id.  
 227.  Id.  
 228.  Id. (“To be sure, there are other persons who may have reason to believe they were exposed 
to significant quantities of asbestos by repeatedly spending time in an enclosed space with an as-
bestos worker—for example, a regular carpool companion.  But any duty rule will necessarily ex-
clude some individuals who, as a causal matter, were harmed by the conduct of potential defend-
ants.”).  
 229.  Id.   
 230.  Id.  
 231.  Id. at 300.  
 232.  Id. at 301.  BNSF argued that “to hold that property owners owe a duty of ordinary care to 
persons who have never set foot on the premises ‘would take the “premises” out of premises liability 
and unsettle the tort law that applies to all property owners in this state.’”  Id. at 300. 
 233.  Id. at 301 (quoting Barnes v. Black, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 634, 637 (1999) (“[T]he duty of care 
encompasses a duty to avoid exposing persons to risks of injury that occur off site if the landowner’s 
property is maintained in such a manner as to expose persons to an unreasonable risk of injury off-
site.”)).  
 234.  Id. at 301–02. 
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II.  ANALYSIS 
The California Supreme Court’s decision in Kesner is one of the most 
recent to be added to the expanding group of take-home asbestos exposure 
cases.235  State court jurisprudence in this area is wide-ranging, inconsistent, 
and, at times, contradictory.236  However, the rationale that the court used in 
Kesner presents an opportunity for courts that have previously rejected find-
ing a duty of care for take-home exposures to reevaluate those decisions.  
This Part will first explain why the Kesner court’s decision was correctly 
decided.237  It will examine the policy arguments both in favor of and against 
finding a duty and assert that the Kesner court was right in finding that the 
public interest in imposing a duty outweighed the interests underlying the 
reasons not to do so.238  Additionally, this Part will highlight the two principle 
takeaways from the Kesner holding and how these takeaways provide a 
framework for consistency in future decisions in this area of law.239 
Next, this Part will illustrate how the Kesner court’s rationale can be 
applied in Maryland, where courts have held that an employer had no duty to 
prevent secondary exposure of asbestos to a third party, without requiring a 
reversal in long-standing tort principles.240  This Part will highlight how Mar-
yland courts have previously approached foreseeability and argue that it can 
apply a Kesner-esque analysis to future take-home cases.241  Following Kes-
ner will limit the existing policy concerns and free Maryland courts to focus 
on the foreseeability of the harm in their analysis.  It will explain the signifi-
cance of the “household member” qualification, which will be key in allow-
ing Maryland courts to find a duty of care towards secondarily exposed plain-
tiffs.242  Finally, this Part will argue that take-home asbestos cases are 
uniquely suited to allow courts to rely on foreseeability without contradicting 
existing employer liability precedents from other areas of law.243 
                                                 
 235.  Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 546 (2009) 
(explaining that since the beginning of 2005, a “growing number of courts have decided whether 
premises owners owe a duty to ‘take home’ exposure claimants”).  
 236.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 237.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 238.  See infra Part II.A.1. 
 239.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 240.  Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 119 Md. App. 395, 705 A.2d 58 (1998). 
 241.  See infra Part II.B. 
 242.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 243.  See infra Part II.B.3. 
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A.  In Kesner, the Court Correctly Held That Employers Owed a Duty 
to Household Members of Their Employees and Created a Path for 
Jurisdictions to Follow in Future Take-Home Cases 
Whether a person or entity has a duty to another is a question of law 
determined by judges, rather than juries.244  The judiciaries in states that have 
dealt with the question of secondary exposure have focused primarily on one 
of two things in making their determination of whether the law mandates a 
duty: foreseeability of harm or the relationship between the parties.245  In 
California, the Civil Code provides generally that everyone has a duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care towards others, unless there is a clear statutory provi-
sion, excepting duty, or public policy that mandates creation of an excep-
tion.246  In analyzing the Rowland factors, the California Supreme Court 
properly balanced the two competing factors for determining the existence of 
a duty.247  By placing an emphasis on the foreseeability of the danger and 
recognizing the inherent drawbacks of establishing a duty rule that would 
allow for increased plaintiffs, the court produced a framework for dealing 
with take-home exposure cases in a manner that is both fair and efficient. 
1.  Foreseeability Equals Fairness: Creating a Duty Based on the 
Foreseeably Injured Household Member Protects Innocent 
Victims While Simultaneously Containing the Potential Plaintiff 
Pool 
In his revelatory book The Costs of Accidents, Guido Calabresi infused 
economic principles into the study of tort law in order to create what he 
                                                 
 244.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 355 (2000).  
 245.  See Meghan E. Flinn, A Continuing War with Asbestos: The Stalemate Among State Courts 
on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos Exposure, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 713, 723–24 (2014) 
(highlighting foreseeability and the relationship between the parties but also noting that two juris-
dictions have used a third method, wherein they applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts and 
determined liability based on whether the defendant actions constituted misfeasance or nonfea-
sance).  Misfeasance is characterized by “an affirmative act,” whereas nonfeasance is merely an 
“omi[ssion] of an act.”  Id. at 724–25.  This distinction is limited to two jurisdictions and will ulti-
mately involve what amounts to a foreseeability or relationship analysis.  Someone who acts affirm-
atively has a duty to others to use reasonable care, whereas someone who simply does not act has a 
duty only where a “special relation[ship]” exists between the parties.  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965)). 
 246.  See supra notes 201–202 and accompanying text. 
 247.  See supra notes 180–181 and accompanying text. 
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thought could be a fairer, more efficient system.248  One of Calabresi’s posi-
tions centered on the idea of the “cheapest cost avoider.”249  The “cheapest 
cost-avoider” was “the person who could avoid an accident at lowest cost” 
and who “was liable whether or not that person took optimal care.”250  Ad-
mittedly, this proposal was created with the intention of placing the legal re-
sponsibility on the cheapest cost-avoider, thus holding the cost-avoider 
strictly liable for all harms.251  This makes it a somewhat imperfect fit in the 
take-home asbestos realm.252  However, the underlying foundation for the 
idea can be useful in explaining the significance of the employer’s foreseea-
bility of secondary exposure when determining liability.253  In take-home as-
bestos cases, the employer or product manufacturer was the cheapest cost-
avoider because once the risks of secondary asbestos exposure through the 
employees’ clothing were known and therefore foreseeable, the employers 
were in the easiest, or cheapest, position to reduce the harm.254  In Kesner 
specifically, the defendants could have minimized the danger by simply in-
forming their employees that harmful asbestos dust could be carried on their 
clothing to places outside the workplace and providing changing rooms and 
workplace procedures to ensure that dust-laden clothes did not leave the site. 
Additionally, the household members exposed to asbestos are often 
largely (if not totally) unaware of the inherent risks involved in secondary 
                                                 
 248.  GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970); see also Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting 
from Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613, 627 (2005) (explaining that The Costs of Accidents’ goal 
was to “identify criteria or goals against which any accident compensation system, including our 
current tort system, can be assessed”).   
 249.  See CALABRESI, supra note 248, at 135 n.1. 
 250.  Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 1291, 1292 (1992). 
 251.  Id.  
 252.  Making employers strictly liable for asbestos exposures to people whom they never inter-
acted with would be unworkable for myriad reasons.  
 253.  See Richard A. Posner, Guido Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents: A Reassessment, 64 
MD. L. REV. 12, 15–16 (2005) (acknowledging that the “influential simplification” of “finding the 
‘cheapest cost avoider’” provides a useful way to consider “legal doctrines, procedures, and insti-
tutions as policy instruments analyzable in terms of the balance between the benefits and the costs 
that they produce” (quoting CALABRESI, supra note 248, at 135 n.1)).  
 254.  See Levine, infra note 256; see also Bobo v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 855 F.3d 1294, 1305 
(11th Cir. 2017) (“[Employer] was in the best position to protect people like [plaintiff] from take-
home asbestos exposure by complying with the relevant regulations or internal policies that were 
designed for that purpose . . . .”); Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006) 
(noting that it would have been “relatively easy” for the employer in that case to provide warnings 
to workers about how to handle their asbestos-laden clothing and the dangers it posed outside the 
workplace).   
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exposure.255  In a Comment for the Washington Law Review,256 Rebecca Lev-
ine pointed to the fact that the employer is in the best position to prevent take-
home exposure as support for her argument that a Washington court correctly 
found that the employer in that case did owe a duty to the secondarily exposed 
plaintiff.257  Levine asserted that large employers engaged in interstate com-
merce can be expected to have “superior access to information regarding as-
bestos exposure . . . [and] relevant scientific data,” thus placing them in the 
best position to protect both their workers and their workers’ household 
members.258 
The employers being in the best position to prevent the harm from oc-
curring complements the “Calabresian” idea of holding the cheapest cost-
avoider liable.  Furthermore, it justifies the courts that have put a heavy em-
phasis on foreseeability.  Because employers are in the best position to min-
imize the risks of secondary exposure, foreseeability should be the paramount 
indicator of liability.  In Kesner, the defendants knew, or at least should have 
known,259 that their employees’ clothes could endanger others outside the 
workplace.  Specifically, it was foreseeable that employees’ household mem-
bers would come into contact with the employees’ work clothes on a regular 
basis.260  Indeed, the Kesner decision stated that any reasonable employer 
requiring employees to use asbestos during the mid-1970s would expect that 
asbestos fibers could attach to the employees’ clothing and harm people who 
lived with them.261  In doing so, the court acknowledged that the defendants 
were “best situated” to prevent such injuries. By holding that the defendants 
have a duty of care towards non-employee household members, the court in-
                                                 
 255.  See, e.g., Bobo, 855 F.3d at 1298 (explaining it was “more likely than not that [the plaintiff] 
unknowingly inhaled dangerous concentrations of asbestos fibers as she ‘shook out’ [the em-
ployee’s] work clothes” (quoting Bobo v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 138 F. Supp. 3d 1285, 1297 
(N.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2015))); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tenn. 
2008) (noting that [employer’s] employees left work each day “unaware of the dangers posed by 
the asbestos fibers on their contaminated work clothes”).   
 256.  Rebecca Leah Levine, Clearing the Air: Ordinary Negligence in Take-Home Asbestos Ex-
posure Litigation, 86 WASH. L. REV. 359 (2011).  
 257.  Id. at 389–90; see Rochon v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., No. 58579-7-I, 2007 Wash. App. 
LEXIS 2392, at *7 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2007).  
 258.  Levine, supra note 256, at 390.  
 259.  See supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text. 
 260.  See Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1149 (N.J. 2006) (“It requires no leap of 
imagination to presume that . . . [the employee’s] spouse would be handling [the employee’s] 
clothes in the normal and expected process of laundering them so that the garments could be worn 
to work again.”).  
 261.  Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 292 (Cal. 2016) (“A reasonably thoughtful person 
making industrial use of asbestos during the . . . [mid-1970s] would take into account the possibility 
that asbestos fibers could become attached to an employee’s clothing or person, travel to that em-
ployee’s home, and thereby reach other persons who lived in the home.”).  
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centivized employers to take precautionary measures to avoid these inju-
ries.262  The California Supreme Court heavily emphasized the fact that take-
home exposures were foreseeable to the employer.  This attention was war-
ranted because it holds the party with the best opportunity to prevent the harm 
liable, providing the fairest analysis of tort liability. 
Advocates of relationship-based duty for take-home exposure argue that 
the reliance on foreseeability will create an indeterminate pool of plaintiffs, 
resulting in unfair burdens to both employers and the judicial system.263  The 
threat that courts will be flooded with asbestos-related claims has merit, as 
past Supreme Court decisions have made reference to both an “asbestos-liti-
gation crisis”264 and the “elephantine mass of asbestos cases.”265  However, 
by clarifying that its holding only extends a duty to household members of 
the employee, the Kesner court wisely limits the pool of potential plaintiffs 
and weakens the viability of this counterargument.266  The reasons against 
extending duty are premised on the idea that there would be nowhere to draw 
the line as to who can file a claim.  Once the duty is extended to someone 
who is not an employee or who has never been on the property, there is no 
logical way to distinguish between that person and anyone else who may 
claim to have been secondarily exposed.267  However, the Kesner court es-
sentially created the line by limiting the duty to “persons who live with the 
worker and are thus foreseeably in close and sustained contact with the 
worker over a significant period of time.”268  Liability only extends toward 
those who can be expected to have regular close contact with the employee.269  
This easily distinguishes a son or daughter, or a husband or wife, from the 
                                                 
 262.  Id. at 297. 
 263.  See id. (acknowledging “[d]efendants’ most forceful contention is a finding of duty in these 
cases would open the door to an ‘enormous pool of potential plaintiffs’”); see also Yelena Kotlarsky, 
The “Peripheral Plaintiff”: Duty Determinations in Take-Home Asbestos Cases, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 451, 485 (2012) (“The real concern for courts that make ‘no duty’ determinations in take-
home asbestos cases lies in the perceived endless liability that defendants would face if the court 
found that a duty existed.”).  
 264.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
 265.  Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).  As a result of the burden on the 
courts, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation in 1990 to 
examine the effects of the crisis and create potential remedies.  See Levine, supra note 256, at 374; 
see also AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 33 (1991) (explaining that the purpose was to “address the substantial 
number of asbestos personal injury cases and the complex issues they present”). 
 266.  See Levine, supra note 256, at 392 (presciently stating that “[i]n order to control the num-
ber of take-home exposure claims, a court could limit the scope of the duty to household members 
or to immediate family members”).   
 267.  See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 608 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. 2005) (noting that find-
ing liability under these circumstances would “create an almost infinite universe of potential plain-
tiffs” (quoting Widera v. Ettco Wire & Cable Corp., 611 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571 (App. Div. 1994))).   
 268.  Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 298 (Cal. 2016). 
 269.  Id. 
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unlimited universe of potential plaintiffs who critics warned would be cre-
ated.  Claims brought by someone who frequented the same neighborhood 
bar as the employee on their way home, or a fellow passenger on the bus, 
would be outside the scope of liability imposed by the Kesner court.270  Kes-
ner strikes a “workable balance” between ensuring that reasonably foreseea-
ble victims are compensated and “protecting courts and defendants from the 
costs associated with litigation of disproportionately meritless claims.”271 
2. Striving for Clarity: Kesner Creates a Framework for Determining 
Duty That Will Create Consistency in This Fragmented Area of 
Law 
As the prevalence of take-home cases has increased, scholars and legal 
commentators have attempted to explain the different approaches that juris-
dictions have taken to determining duty and to highlight the general direction 
in which courts across the country are moving.272  There is still a great deal 
of inconsistency.  Part II.A.1 explained why a heavier emphasis on foreseea-
bility can create a fairer result for victims and minimize the policy concerns 
that have previously led to a reluctance of extending duty.  Indeed, the more 
recent decisions in this area of law seem to indicate a trend toward finding a 
duty based on foreseeability.273  The inherent factual nature of determining 
whether the risk of take-home exposure is foreseeable, however, can create 
inconsistency and confusion in itself.274  As a result, there are two prominent 
criticisms made regarding foreseeability as the determinant of duty: (1) there 
is a lack of uniformity as to when a duty exists; and (2) in using facts to 
                                                 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Id.  
 272.  See, e.g., David M. Melancon, Airing Asbestos Litigation’s Dirty Laundry: “Take-Home 
Asbestos Exposure and the Ongoing Efforts to Determine the Scope of the Duty of Premises Owners 
and Employers, FOR DEF., Apr. 2016, at 48, 54 (explaining the jurisdictional difference between 
using foreseeability of harm or the relationship of the parties in determining duty, and arguing that 
“decisions appear to be trending toward a finding of no duty,” while acknowledging that asbestos 
defense attorneys should be aware of the various rationales used by courts throughout the country); 
Behrens, supra note 235, at 545–49 (highlighting the varying state approaches and suggesting that 
courts consider the harmful impact of allowing duty to be stretched too far); Victor E. Schwartz, A 
Letter to the Nation’s Trial Judges: Asbestos Litigation, Major Progress Made over the Past Decade 
and Hurdles You Can Vault in the Next, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 20–24 (2012) (noting that a 
majority of jurisdictions have found no duty, but there is a trend of courts dealing with post-1972 
exposures increasingly being likely to find that there is a duty); Kotlarsky, supra note 263; Levine, 
supra note 256; Flinn, supra note 245. 
 273.  See Bobo v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 855 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2017); Kesner v. Superior Court, 
384 P.3d 283 (Cal. 2016).  
 274.  Kotlarsky, supra note 263, at 459–60. 
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determine whether a duty exists, judges often take on the role of juries, fur-
ther muddling an already inconsistent process.275  In her article for the Ford-
ham Law Review, Yelena Kotlarsky asserts that section 7 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts276 provides a solution.277  She argues that under a Restatement 
regime, Section (a) establishes a default duty, thus designating questions of 
fact—when the exposure took place, the nature of the relationship, et 
cetera—solely to the discretion of the jury.278  Additionally, she asserts that 
Section (b), which allows a court to deny or limit liability in exceptional cases 
but requires them to articulate a countervailing principle or policy reason ex-
plaining the denial,279 would allow state courts to maintain their autonomy 
and find no duty.280  However, she believes that it would require those courts 
to be clearer in articulating their policy reasons for doing so and create more 
transparency across jurisdictions.281  Thus, the Restatement solution would 
lead courts to consider their “no duty” decisions more seriously and likely 
lead to fewer “no duty” holdings.282 
Kotlarsky’s reliance on the Restatement is well-founded and undoubt-
edly would have clarified some of the confusion and inconsistency surround-
ing this area of law prior to Kesner.  However, the scope of the Kesner ruling 
may actually provide an even more coherent path forward, where a more me-
chanical, less fluid factual inquiry is possible.  First, the court defines when 
an employer could have foreseeably known that there was a danger of sec-
ondary asbestos exposure outside the workplace.283  Similar to other court 
                                                 
 275.  See, e.g., id. at 460 (stating that when courts analyze foreseeability they “overstep their 
role by deciding questions of fact” and that they do not set a “clear standard for courts to follow in 
future cases that involve slightly different facts”).  
 276.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7.  
Section 7(a) states “[a]n actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s 
conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”  Id. § 7(a).  Section 7(b) states “[i]n exceptional cases, 
when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a 
particular class of cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty 
of reasonable care requires modification.”  Id. § 7(b). 
 277.  Kotlarsky, supra note 263, at 460–61. 
 278.  Id. at 486.  
 279.  See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 280.  Kotlarsky, supra note 263, at 486–87.  
 281.  See id. at 487 (explaining that “courts should state their true concerns unequivocally by 
holding that the possibility of adding to an already massive litigation militates in favor of finding 
that employers and premises owners generally owe no duty to third-party plaintiffs”).  
 282.  Id.  
 283.  See supra note 208.  
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rulings,284 the Kesner court relies on the 1972 OSHA regulations285 as a bright 
line demarcating when an employer had reasonable foreseeability of harms 
from take-home exposure.286  The court rejected the defendants’ argument 
that there was no scientific consensus regarding the risks of take-home as-
bestos at the time the exposures took place.287  It specifically emphasized that 
the OSHA regulations reinforced the reasonable expectation and provided at 
least constructive knowledge that asbestos could be carried on the clothing 
of the employee and harm members of the employees’ households.288  Sec-
ond, as noted above, the Kesner court limits employer liability only to their 
employees’ household members.289  The court stressed that an employee re-
turning home at the end of every work day and interacting with members of 
their household was “not an unusual occurrence, but rather a baseline as-
sumption that can be made about employees’ behavior.”290 
The Kesner ruling potentially eliminates the two concerns that prompted 
a suggested reliance on the Restatement.  Following the Kesner approach 
could minimize the factual analysis required to determine whether there 
should be liability.  Judges would simply have to determine if the exposure 
occurred after the promulgation of the 1972 OSHA Regulations and whether 
the plaintiff was a household member of the employee.  The answer to the 
first question can be gleaned with relative ease; the judge would simply have 
to determine when the employee worked for the employer.  The question of 
whether the plaintiff is a household member is admittedly more difficult to 
discern and will require clarity following Kesner.  There, the court defined 
household members as “persons who live with the worker.”291  This defini-
tion is ambiguous and could, in some cases, require further factual analysis.292  
                                                 
 284.  See, e.g., Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar, 432 Md. 523, 537–39, 69 A.3d 1028, 1037–39 
(2013); Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 353 (Tenn. 2008); see also Bobo v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 855 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing the 1972 OSHA regulations 
among other subsequent regulations in order to find that harm was foreseeable for exposures that 
took place from 1975–1997).  But see Martin v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 561 F.3d 439, 445 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (noting that plaintiff’s expert testimony indicated that the first studies of the dangers of 
“bystander exposure” were published in 1965).   
 285.  See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
 286.  Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 292–93 (Ca. 2016). 
 287.  Id. at 292.  The exposures in the two consolidated cases here ranged from 1972–1974 and 
1973–1979, respectively.  Id. at 288–89.  
 288.  Id. at 299 (“[T]he OSHA Standard affirmed the commonsense reality that asbestos fibers 
could be carried on the person or clothing of employees to their homes and could be inhaled there 
by household members.”).   
 289.  See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 290.  Kesner, 384 P.3d at 294.  
 291.  Id. at 298.   
 292.  See id. at 305 (remanding the case to the trial court so the parties could submit additional 
evidence as to whether Johnny Kesner was a member of George Kesner’s household).  Johnny was 
George’s nephew and played with him at least three times per week, but the court wanted more 
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Courts will need to create precedent through these decisions and establish a 
more concrete definition of what constitutes a household member in take-
home asbestos cases.  Once a court has established its definition, it would not 
require evidence or testimony designated for a jury’s interpretation.  The duty 
would exist if the plaintiff was exposed after 1972 and the employer’s rela-
tionship with the employee fit into the respective states’ definition of a house-
hold member.  This would lead to more clarity, as states’ use of Restatement 
§ 7(b) to claim that the policy against overburdening their courts would no 
longer be applicable.  The household member qualification would erase this 
concern. It is important to note this would only create a duty between the 
employer and the employee’s household member; it would not guarantee li-
ability.293  Nevertheless, the Kesner court provides a framework through 
which courts can resolve the volatility in this area of the law in an efficient 
manner. 
B.  Maryland Courts Can Apply the Kesner Rationale in Future Take-
Home Cases Without Upsetting Established Principles 
The Kesner court’s rationale can be used as a guide for Maryland—as 
well as other states that have previously been on Maryland’s side of the ju-
risdictional split294—to find that employers have a duty to prevent secondary 
exposure of asbestos without disrupting the overall duty framework that these 
states use.  Maryland courts have consistently focused on the lack of relation-
ship between the employer and the secondarily exposed party in finding that 
employers do not have a duty.295  This wariness of extending duty to an in-
determinate number of plaintiffs is understandable.296  However, by limiting 
the duty only to an employee’s household members, the Kesner court mini-
mized the number of potential plaintiffs while still allowing a path to recov-
ery for those who were most foreseeably harmed. 
This Subpart will examine the Maryland courts’ acknowledgement of 
foreseeability as the primary determinant of a duty.  It will show that Mary-
land courts have recognized that, following the promulgation of the 1972 
                                                 
information about how long and often he stayed, to determine whether he did actually fall into the 
category of household member.  Id.  
 293.  See W PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164–
65 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining that liability under a negligence claim requires proof of duty, breach, 
causation, and injury).  
 294.  See supra notes 87–94. 
 295.  Adams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 119 Md. App. 395, 411, 705 A.2d 58, 66 (1998); see also 
Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar, 432 Md. 523, 69 A.3d 1028 (2013) (holding that the manufacturer 
of an asbestos-containing product did not have a duty to warn the product user’s wife of the dangers 
of asbestos exposure inherent in the product).  
 296.  See supra notes 263–265 and accompanying text. 
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OSHA regulations, the risks of secondary exposure were at least construc-
tively known and therefore foreseeable.297  Next, it will apply the Kesner 
court’s “household member” qualification to argue that Maryland courts’ 
long-standing rationale that relaxing the employer-employee relationship re-
quirement for duty will lead to an unmanageable avalanche of claims is un-
founded.298  Finally, this Subpart will illustrate that take-home asbestos cases 
are inherently unlike other employer liability claims Maryland courts have 
ruled on, further bolstering the idea that following the Kesner court’s reason-
ing will not upset the state’s long-standing tort principles.299 
1.  Foreseeability Is a Significant Factor in Determining Duty in 
Maryland and Should Be Given the Heaviest Consideration in 
Take-Home Cases 
Maryland courts balance the same foreseeability and policy factors as 
the California court did in Kesner.300  In California, there is a “general duty 
of each person to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for the 
safety of others.”301  Thus, California courts apply the seven factors to deter-
mine whether there should be an exception to this general duty.302  Con-
versely, Maryland courts have no general presumption of duty and use the 
same factors to determine whether one exists.303  This distinction is largely 
insignificant in the outcome of a court’s duty determination.  Indeed, Mary-
land courts have acknowledged for many years: “In cases involving personal 
injury, ‘the principal determinant of duty [is] foreseeability.’”304  Accord-
ingly, Maryland courts confronted with take-home cases should engage in a 
Kesner-style analysis and look to the time when the alleged exposure took 
place in order to determine whether it was foreseeable.305 
                                                 
 297.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 298.  See infra Part II.B.2.  
 299.  See infra Part II.B.3.  
 300.  The factors are: the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the degree of certainty the plain-
tiff suffered the injury; the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the 
injury suffered; the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct; the policy of preventing future 
harm; the extent of the burden on the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a 
duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and the availability, cost, and prevalence of 
insurance for the risk involved.  Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 388 Md. 407, 416, 879 A.2d 
1088, 1093 (2005). These are referred to in California courts as the Rowland factors.  See supra note 
180 and accompanying text. 
 301.  Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 289 (Ca. 2016) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1714(a) (West 2009)).  
 302.  Id. at 290; see supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 303.  Pharmacia, 388 Md. at 416, 879 A.2d at 1093.  
 304.  Id. (quoting Jacques v. First Nat’l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 535, 515 A.2d 756, 760 (1986)).   
 305.  See supra note 286 and accompanying text. 
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The 1972 OSHA regulations can serve as a bright line for determining 
whether employers knew or should have known about the risks of take-home 
asbestos exposure.306  The Kesner court pointed directly to these regulations 
as “sufficient to provide notice of the reasonable foreseeability of such 
harm.”307  Likewise, in Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar, the Maryland Court 
of Appeals acknowledged 1972 as the year when employers generally knew 
of the risks of secondary exposure.308  The court found that a product manu-
facturer was not liable, partially because the exposure in question happened 
between 1968 and 1969, prior to when the defendants would necessarily have 
been responsible for foreseeing the risks of take-home exposure.309  Other 
jurisdictions have recognized 1972 as the year when employers were held 
responsible for having at least constructive knowledge of the risks of take-
home exposure as well.310 
A Maryland court could examine the facts of a secondary exposure case 
in the same way that the California court did.  In Georgia Pacific, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals found that there was no employer liability because “at 
the relevant time,” there was no duty to warn the plaintiff.311  However, if a 
case comes before the court where the secondary exposure took place after 
1972, the analysis would be different—Maryland courts could find that suf-
ficient information did exist “at the relevant time.”312  Similar to the Kesner 
court, they could determine that the employer had either actual or construc-
tive knowledge regarding the risk of secondary exposure. 
In Maryland, the determination of whether a duty exists is essentially a 
policy question of “whether the plaintiff is entitled to protection from the 
defendant.”313  While a finding of foreseeability is not a guarantee of duty in 
a Maryland court, it is the most significant hurdle for the plaintiff to clear.314  
Maryland courts should follow the Kesner court’s lead: treat the 1972 OSHA 
regulations as the breaking point (as the Court of Appeals tacitly did in Geor-
gia Pacific) and determine that post-1972 exposures were foreseeable.  If the 
courts adopt this reasoning, the “principle determinant of duty” would be met 
                                                 
 306.  29 C.F.R. §1910.1001(h) (2016). 
 307.  Kesner, 384 P.3d at 293.  
 308.  432 Md. 523, 537–39, 69 A.3d 1028, 1037–39 (2013).   
 309.  Id. at 541, 69 A.3d at 1039. 
 310.  See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 311.  Georgia Pacific, 432 Md. at 526, 69 A.3d at 1030.  
 312.  Id.  
 313.  Doe v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 388 Md. 407, 415, 879 A.2d 1088, 1093 (2005).   
 314.  Georgia Pacific, 432 Md. at 530, 69 A.3d at 1033; see also The Maryland Survey: 2000-
2001, 61 MD. L. REV. 798, 1051 (2002) (explaining that Maryland courts have noted that in applying 
the foreseeability factor to the determination of duty, the test looks at how extraordinary it was that 
the negligent conduct caused the harm and that generally the defendant will only be held liable when 
he should have known that the plaintiff would suffer harm). 
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and the most significant hurdle would be cleared.315  Therefore, a court should 
find a duty unless it identifies alternative policy reasons which, when bal-
anced, ultimately outweigh the fact that the harm was foreseeable.316 
2. By Limiting Liability for Take-Home Exposure Only to Household 
Members, Maryland Courts’ Concern About Creating an 
Indeterminate Pool of Plaintiffs Would Be Resolved 
In Kesner, the defendants’ “most forceful contention” was that a finding 
of a duty to protect against secondary exposure to asbestos would open the 
door to “an enormous pool of potential plaintiffs.”317  Defendants argued that 
once the principle of liability extends beyond the bounds of the workplace, 
this “enormous pool” would include everyone from “acquaintances [and] ser-
vice providers” to “fellow commuters on public transportation[] and laundry 
workers,” resulting in uncertainty for employers and an oversaturation of 
courtrooms.318  The Kesner court acknowledged the merits of this argument 
but convincingly determined a limit on the scope of the duty would solve the 
problem.319  The court properly held that liability for secondary exposure to 
asbestos extended only to household members of the employee, thereby lim-
iting the plaintiff pool.320  This limitation is well-reasoned and will be crucial 
to addressing the policy concerns that Maryland courts have previously cited 
in finding that there was no duty. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals has itself asserted that household mem-
bers are a distinct class of their own.321  In Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar, 
the defendant attempted to illustrate the universe of potential claimants if the 
court accepted the plaintiff’s argument:  
[W]hether, if the [exposed] worker rides a bus home or stops at a 
bar or grocery store on the way home, the duty to warn would ex-
tend to the bus driver, other passengers on the bus, the bartender, 
                                                 
 315.  See supra notes 304, 314 and accompanying text. 
 316.  See John Bourdeau & Susan L. Thomas, Negligence, in MARYLAND LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA 
§ 11 (2018), 16 M.L.E. Negligence § 11 (explaining that while foreseeability is often considered the 
most important factor in determining duty, courts also weigh public policy considerations and con-
sider whether policy reasons support a cause of action); see also Georgia Pacific, 432 Md. at 530, 
69 A.3d at 1033 (explaining that duty depends on “a number of factors that need to be balanced, 
[and] that the foreseeability of harm to [the plaintiff] . . . may be the most important of [the] factors, 
but that foreseeability of harm [is] not the only factor to be considered”).  
 317.  Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 297 (Ca. 2016). 
 318.  Id. (alteration in original). 
 319.  Id. at 297–98. 
 320.  Id. at 298. 
 321.  Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar, 432 Md. 523, 69 A.3d 1028 (2013).  
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other patrons in the bar, the cashier in the grocery store, or other 
customers.322 
The court dismissed this argument, stating “[w]e are dealing only with 
household members, who constitute an identifiable class of individuals.”323  
Indeed, as the Kesner court noted, a household member is someone who is 
expected to have close and sustained contact with the worker for a prolonged 
period of time.324  Maryland courts, while acknowledging that household 
members are identifiable, should create a specific definition and recognize 
the limits this would place on the potential class of plaintiffs.325  The clerk at 
the sandwich shop where the employee gets his lunch, or the person sitting 
next to the employee on the bus home from work, would certainly not be 
entitled to a duty of care.  The pool of household members would not be 
nearly as vast as the universe of potential plaintiffs the defendant in Georgia 
Pacific claimed would arise, and therefore the policy concerns that have in-
fluenced Maryland decisions in this area are minimized. 
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals declined to extend liability in 
Adams v. Owens-Illinois.326  A case with facts very similar to those alleged 
in Kesner, the court refused to find that the employer owed the employee’s 
spouse a duty of care.327  The court explained that if it extended liability for 
secondary exposure based on a wife “handling . . . her husband’s clothing,” 
the defendant would be liable to anyone who was “in close contact with” the 
husband, “including other family members, automobile passengers, and co-
workers.”328  This could technically be true under Kesner’s household quali-
fication but only if the automobile passengers and co-workers spent a signif-
icant amount of time and slept in the house with the employee.  Because em-
ployees drive people other than household members in their cars and co-
workers do not spend a significant amount of time or nights at each other’s 
homes, a court relying on Kesner would most likely have found employer 
liability towards no one but the wife. 
This further illustrates the effectiveness of using foreseeability to deter-
mine liability.  An employer would not be expected to know if the employee 
frequently comes into close contact with family members who are not mem-
bers of the employee’s household, drives to and from work with other people, 
                                                 
 322.  Id. at 535 n.2, 69 A.3d at 1036 n.2. 
 323.  Id.  
 324.  Kesner, 384 P.3d at 298.  
 325.  See supra Part II.A.2. 
 326.  119 Md. App. 395, 705 A.2d 58 (1998).  
 327.  Id. at 410–11, 705 A.2d at 66.  A woman died of asbestosis she allegedly contracted from 
handling her husband’s work clothing.  The woman’s estate sued her husband’s employer for neg-
ligence.  Id. at 407, 705 A.2d at 65. 
 328.  Id. at 411, 705 A.2d at 66.  
 2018] TAKE-HOME TOXIN 1201 
 
or spends significant time with nonasbestos-exposed co-workers.329  How-
ever, an employer can expect that an employee will return home each work 
day and have close contact with their household members.330  The employer 
can expect that an employee’s spouse might regularly clean their laundry, or 
a child might greet the employee with a hug and some rough-housing as soon 
as they walk in the door.331  Additionally, consider the implications if courts 
do not create a duty to household members based on foreseeability.  An em-
ployer would have no incentive to minimize the asbestos dust leaving the 
worksite, despite fully understanding the danger that the asbestos would pose 
to the people with whom that employee interacts regularly in their home.  By 
drawing the line at household members, courts can protect a class of plaintiffs 
who are most likely to suffer a legitimate, compensable harm without expos-
ing the employer or burdening the court system with an influx of claims.  
Separating the clearly foreseeable plaintiffs from the potentially foreseeable 
plaintiffs will allow courts to balance the competing policy issues in deter-
mining how far to extend liability. 
3.  Distinguishing Duty: Identifying the Unique Nature of Take-
Home Asbestos Exposure While Not Muddling Established 
Maryland Special Relationship Duty Law 
As previously discussed, Maryland courts focus on the relationship be-
tween the parties as a limitation on liability to third parties, rather than ex-
tending liability to any foreseeably harmed party.332  However, the nature of 
secondary exposure cases is different than the other employer-employee 
cases which Maryland courts have previously relied on in refusing to extend 
take-home liability to employers.  First, asbestos exposure typically causes 
harm only if it takes place over a prolonged period.333  Second, Maryland 
                                                 
 329.  See Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 298 (Ca. 2016) (noting “[p]ersons whose con-
tact with the worker is more incidental, sporadic, or transitory do not, as a class, share the same 
characteristics as household members and are therefore not within the scope of the duty we identify 
here”).  Additionally, this lack of knowledge or foreseeability can extend to all indeterminate plain-
tiffs, including those whom an employee might come into close contact with at a bar after work, 
while participating in a recreational sports league, or babysitting, among other things.   
 330.  Id.  
 331.  See id. (explaining that employees would have close contact with household members on 
a regular basis over many years).  
 332.  See supra Part I.C.  
 333.  See ASBESTOS PROFILE, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining that factors such as how much as-
bestos one is exposed to and how long the exposure lasts determine whether exposure will cause 
harm); James Barron & Jon Elsen, No Asbestos Found in Air After Blast, NY TIMES (July 19, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/19/nyregion/19cnd-explode.html (quoting New York City offi-
cials who explain that “developing an asbestos-related illness after being exposed for a short time—
even at high levels—is very unlikely”); Michelle Tsai, How Much Asbestos Is Too Much?, SLATE 
(July 19, 2007, 7:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ex-
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courts have established a specific test that must be met in order to find liabil-
ity in asbestos cases.334  While this reliance on the special relationship be-
tween the employer and the employee may be appropriate in other third-party 
liability settings, it is misguided in the secondary exposure to asbestos realm. 
Two cases that have dealt with this issue are Doe v. Pharmacia & 
Upjohn Co.335 and Dehn v. Edgecombe.336  These cases have been cited in a 
past Maryland take-home case as a reason not to extend liability.337  In Phar-
macia, the court’s familiar concern was that if it found the employer had a 
duty toward the employee’s wife, it would lead to a potentially limitless num-
ber of future claims from a vast range of plaintiffs.338  However, the nature 
of the risk of illness through take-home asbestos exposure is markedly dif-
ferent from the risk of illness through HIV transmission.  As the Pharmacia 
court rightly pointed out, any possible sexual partner could potentially be in-
fected, which would create a “universe” of plaintiffs.339  Yet, because HIV 
can be transmitted in a single sexual encounter, the potential for harm and the 
scope of potential plaintiffs are much greater.  Asbestos, on the other hand, 
is typically harmful only if the exposure is consistent over a prolonged period 
of time.340  The pool of people with whom an employee could be expected to 
have consistent, prolonged contact is inherently smaller.  Thus, the universe 
of potential plaintiffs that the Pharmacia court was concerned about expand-
ing would be significantly smaller in a take-home asbestos case as compared 
to the HIV transmittal case it was deciding. 
Similarly, in Dehn, the Court of Appeals did not extend the doctor-pa-
tient duty to the patient’s spouse.341  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argu-
ment that the clear foreseeability of the patient having unprotected sex with 
his spouse after the vasectomy imposed a duty on the doctor toward the 
spouse.342  The court again resisted the expansion of tort liability.343  How-
ever, as in Pharmacia, the number of foreseeable plaintiffs for the doctor here 
                                                 
plainer/2007/07/how_much_asbestos_is_too_much.html (“Usually, it takes years of continued ex-
posure to high levels of asbestos—like those in an industrial environment—to cause health prob-
lems.”).  
 334.  See infra notes 345–353 and accompanying text. 
 335.  388 Md. 407, 879 A.2d 1088 (2005); see supra notes 149–160 and accompanying text. 
 336.  384 Md. 606, 865 A.2d 603 (2005). 
 337.  Georgia Pacific, LLC v. Farrar, 432 Md. 523, 528, 69 A.3d 1028, 1031–32 (Md. 2013).  
 338.  Pharmacia, 388 Md. at 420–21, 879 A.2d at 1095–96 (“rejecting the plaintiff’s claim 
against the employer on the rationale that ‘extending the duty [to spouses] would apply to all poten-
tial sexual partners and expand the universe of potential plaintiffs’” (quoting Dehn, 384 Md. At 627, 
865 A.2d at 615))). 
 339.  Id. at 419–20, 879 A.2d at 1095–96 (quoting Dehn, 384 Md. at 627, 865 A.2d at 615). 
 340.  See supra note 333 and accompanying text. 
 341.  Dehn, 384 Md. at 622, 865 A.2d at 612; see supra notes 161–166 and accompanying text. 
 342.  Id. 
 343.  Id. 
 2018] TAKE-HOME TOXIN 1203 
 
would be much higher under these circumstances than for any employer fac-
ing potential liability for secondary asbestos exposure.  Here, the employee-
patient could have sexual intercourse with one other person, one time, for 
potential liability to attach.  This would effectively create an indeterminate 
number of potential plaintiffs. This, however, is not a risk inherent to asbestos 
exposure.  Because of the nature of asbestos exposure, an employee’s house-
hold members are the only ones with whom it is clearly foreseeable there 
would be enough contact for a potential exposure to occur.344  The nature of 
asbestos exposure effectively contains the pool of potential plaintiffs in ways 
that distinguish these cases from the rationale used in previous Maryland spe-
cial relationship decisions. 
Another distinction that limits the risk of an indeterminate pool of plain-
tiffs in take-home asbestos cases is that Maryland courts have established 
specific causation requirements for asbestos claims.345  In Eagle-Picher In-
dustries, Inc. v. Balbos,346 the Maryland Court of Appeals had to determine 
whether there can be liability where the decedents did not work directly with 
asbestos products but were present on the work site where they were used.347  
The court created the “frequency, regularity, and proximity” test, which eval-
uates the nature of the asbestos-containing product, the frequency with which 
it is used, the proximity of the plaintiff to where it was used (considering both 
distance and time), and the regularity of the plaintiff’s exposure to it.348  This 
test determined whether the asbestos exposure alleged could have caused the 
harm serving as the basis of the claim, and it became the standard used to 
establish causation in negligence cases alleging asbestos exposure in Mary-
land.349  Most recently, the court relied on this test in another take-home ex-
posure case, Dixon v. Ford Motor Co.350  There, the court determined evi-
dence the plaintiff’s husband worked around asbestos products “on average, 
twice a week, 10 months a year, for 13 years” and that the plaintiff often dealt 
with her husband’s dust-laden clothes and other accumulated asbestos fibers 
                                                 
 344.  See Kesner, 384 P.3d at 298 (noting that household members are persons who “live with 
the worker and are thus foreseeably in close and sustained contact with [them] over a significant 
period of time”); supra note 333 and accompanying text (explaining that asbestos harm requires 
prolonged and sustained contact).  
 345.  See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992).  
 346.  326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992).  
 347.  Id. at 210, 604 A.2d at 460.  Because the decedents in Balbos were employees in a work-
place where asbestos was used, but did not actually use the asbestos containing products themselves, 
the question for the court was not one of duty, but causation.  Id.  
 348.  Id.   
 349.  Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Saville, 418 Md. 496, 503, 16 A.3d 159, 163 (2011).  
 350.  433 Md. 137, 70 A.3d 328 (2013).   
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was enough to meet the “frequency, regularity, and proximity test” and es-
tablish causation.351  Additionally, in affirming the lower court’s decision to 
admit a plaintiff’s expert’s trial testimony,352 the court stressed the exposure 
in this case was “continuous and cumulative in effect,” and the expert’s opin-
ion was “not in the context of one or two incidental exposures” to the asbestos 
product.353 
The requirement that there must be “frequency, regularity, and proxim-
ity” to asbestos is necessary to prevail on a take-home asbestos claim in Mar-
yland.  However, this requirement does not exist for other types of employer-
employee liability claims.  In Pharmacia and Dehn, for instance, the causa-
tion factor would never be in doubt.354  In those cases, a third-party plaintiff 
could prove causation if they suffered harm after engaging in sexual inter-
course with the employee or patient just one time.  This would offer the em-
ployer or doctor very little protection against a negligence action if a duty 
was assumed.  Conversely, the three-part test articulated in Eagle-Picher v. 
Balbos adds extra protection for employers in asbestos cases, in addition to 
the household qualification.355  Thus, if a duty was found based on foreseea-
bility and the plaintiff was a household member, the plaintiff would still need 
to show that they were frequently and regularly in proximity to the asbestos-
laden clothing within the household.356  The nature of a household member 
would presumably lead to a positive showing in this test.357  Nevertheless, the 
“frequency, regularity, and proximity” test provides an extra layer of protec-
tion for employers and further distinguishes employer duty in the take-home 
asbestos realm from other types of employer duty in Maryland courts. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In Kesner v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court of California held that 
an employer has a duty of care towards a household member of an employee 
who is secondarily exposed to asbestos after 1972.358  The Kesner court cre-
ated a framework that can be implemented by states that have focused on 
                                                 
 351.  Id. at 151, 70 A.3d at 336. 
 352.  The defendant took issue with the expert’s statement that “every exposure to asbestos is a 
substantial contributing cause” and argued that the trial court should have subjected that conclusion 
to a Frye/Reed analysis.  Id. at 149, 70 A.3d at 334–35.  A Frye/Reed analysis is required when the 
expert’s testimony involves a “novel scientific method” and there must be assurance provided that 
the expert’s opinion is acceptable within the relevant scientific community.  Id. at 149–50, 70 A.3d 
at 335.  
 353.  Id. at 151, 70 A.3d at 336.  
 354.  See supra notes 335, 341 and accompanying text. 
 355.  Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 604 A.2d 445 (1992). 
 356.  Id.  
 357.  See supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
 358.  See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
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foreseeability and those that have looked to the relationship between the par-
ties, thus creating stability and clarity in a chaotic area of law.359  In Mary-
land, courts have previously been reluctant to create a duty between an em-
ployer and a non-employee because of the risk of creating an indeterminate 
pool of plaintiffs.360  However, the household member requirement articu-
lated in Kesner helps resolve this issue by ensuring that an employer’s duty 
exists only with those whom the employee had a predictably close and sus-
tained relationship.361  Additionally, the distinctive nature of secondary as-
bestos claims ensures that settled upon tort decisions within the state need 
not be affected.362  Maryland courts would benefit from adopting the ap-
proach taken by the Kesner court in future take-home asbestos exposure 
cases. 
                                                 
 359.  See supra notes 283–293 and accompanying text. 
 360.  See supra notes 295–298 and accompanying text. 
 361.  See supra notes 329–331 and accompanying text. 
 362.  See supra Part II.B.3.  
